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PREFACE
This Report builds on internal CEDEFOP research carried out by Ms Sarah Elson-Rogers
before this project was commissioned in November 1997.  I am most grateful to Ms Elson-
Rogers and CEDEFOP for allowing me to draw so readily on this work.  I am particularly
grateful to Ms Elson-Rogers for the guidance given at every stage of the project, including
suggesting experts to contact, pointing out written material of relevance and commenting on
various drafts of the Report.
The Report forms part of a much larger CEDEFOP programme of research on the Financing
of Vocational Education and Training.  This includes a series of portraits describing the way
in which vocational education and training is financed within individual Member States of the
European Union, as well as a number of discussion dossiers on certain aspects and
mechanisms of financing, of which this Report is one.  For further information on this
programme contact:
Sarah Elson-Rogers/Sven-Åge Westphalen,
CEDEFOP, POB 27 Finikas,
GR-55102 - Thessaloniki, Greece.
Fax: 00-30-31-490-117
Email: ser@cedefop.gr
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OUTPUT-RELATED FUNDING
 IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING -
A DISCUSSION PAPER AND CASE STUDIES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Report aims to inform policy-makers about the issues arising from and practice of
funding Vocational Education and Training (VET) on the basis of programme outcomes
rather than enrolment/attendance (i.e. switching the emphasis of funding from inputs to
outputs).  It gathers together in a single dossier an outline of the policy issues output-
related funding (ORF) generates as well as a number of real-world examples of its use
in countries within and beyond the European Union.  The objective of the Report,
therefore, is to provide a useful summary document of evidence on ORF and its
practice, which policy-makers and others may wish to consult.
ORF offers several benefits to policy-makers.  These include:
· giving training providers more flexibility in the type of provision offered
· enhancing improvements in performance
· increasing value for money by providing an incentive to fulfil certain achievements
and by discouraging ‘time-serving’ in training which does not lead to outcomes
· simplifying administration and clarifying audit requirements
 
 Set against these benefits are a number of operational issues which need to be tackled
before ORF can be introduced, as well as a number of consequences and implications
which can arise from its implementation and use.  These can be summarised in a
series of policy questions:
 
· What level of ORF is required to reap the optimum benefits of tying funding to
output?
· Is ORF passed on to all those in the contracting chain?
· How is output defined?
· How is output measured?
· How are funding uncertainties minimised?
· Do the measures of performance used to financially reward and penalise training
providers act as good proxies for the long-term labour market prospects of
trainees?
· Are only the best candidates ‘creamed off’ onto output-related funded
programmes?
· To what extent are eligibility criteria used to counter the danger of ‘creaming’ by
requiring training providers to ‘dredge’?
· How is participation of disadvantaged members of the labour market protected?
· What consequences does ORF have for the content and occupational spread of
training provision?
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· Does ORF lead to cash flow problems among training providers?
· Are particular types of training provider more at risk than others from the operation
of ORF?
· Does ORF raise barriers to entry for new training providers?
· Are the administrative rules and regulations that accompany ORF simpler or more
complicated than other systems?
· Does ORF reward the value added by training intervention?
· Does ORF reward all or only some of the value added by training providers?
· What checks and balances are in place to ensure probity and reliability?
· What mechanisms are used to counter these problems?
· How successful is ORF in achieving its aims?
The Report outlines the operation of ORF in countries within and beyond the EU with
the above policy questions in mind.  In particular, attention is focused on the British
system of funding government training schemes, the US system of training the
disadvantaged and poor through a federally funded programme, and Dutch proposals
to use some form of ORF in the near future to finance adult and vocational training.  As
such the Report provides a wealth of material for policy-makers and other interested
parties to reflect on a funding arrangement from which other EU Member States may
wish to borrow or learn.
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SECTION ONE:
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
1.1 Aims and Objectives
This Report aims to inform policy-makers about the issues arising from and practice of
funding VET on the basis of programme outcomes rather than enrolment/attendance
(i.e. switching the emphasis from inputs to outputs).  It outlines in a single dossier the
policy issues output-related funding (ORF) generates as well as a number of real-world
examples of its use in countries within and beyond the European Union (EU).  The
objective of the Report, therefore, is to provide a useful summary document of
evidence on ORF and its practice, which policy-makers and others may wish to consult.
It should be noted at the outset that ORF in the Report is discussed in the context of
public sector provision of initial vocational training and training for the unemployed -
although the discussion could also apply to the public provision of continuing vocational
training.  The terms ‘output’ and ‘outcome’ are used interchangeably throughout the
Report.
1.2 Methods
Material for the Report was gathered in a number of ways; four avenues in particular
were pursued.  First, several on-line bibliographic searches were launched using
different search engines and a range of keywords.  The latter included ‘output-related
funding’, ‘performance-related funding’, ‘financing training’, ‘funding training’ and
‘creaming’ as well as titles of specific training programmes.  Through these means, the
contents pages of recent (post-1990) social science journals were searched.  If the title
and abstract seemed relevant to the focus of the project, the articles were consulted.
Secondly, in order to ensure that the material available for inclusion in the Report was
as up-to-date and comprehensive as possible, international Vocational and Education
Training (VET) experts were contacted by letter, fax or email.  They were asked to
supply information or contacts relevant to the Report’s focus.  A total of 54 experts,
including VET researchers, national policy-makers, lobbyists and representatives of
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international organisations, were contacted in this way during the life of the project.
Most of these were based in the EU, and nearly all of them responded with information
of one sort or another.
Thirdly, CEDEFOP carried out a number of searches of its own and lodged requests for
information with organisations and individuals with whom it is in regular contact, making
additional documents available to the project.
The fourth material-gathering device was the traditional library search.  Two libraries in
particular were the focus of attention: the University of Leicester library and the
Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) library in Sheffield.  Keyword
searches were made at both.
1.3 Outline of the Report
The Report consists of two parts:
· an outline of some of the economic and social issues arising from ORF regimes
· three examples of ORF usage from both within and outside the European Union
The Report is structured accordingly.  Section Two discusses the policy issues which
may arise, Section Three provides information on how ORF has so far been used to
fund VET in several countries and Section Four concludes the Report with a short
summary which brings the two major parts of the Report together.
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SECTION TWO:
DISCUSSION ISSUES ARISING FROM OUTPUT-RELATED FUNDING
This section of the Report discusses what output-related funding (ORF) is, the rationale
and principles behind its introduction, a series of operational issues, and a number of
consequences and implications which can arise from its implementation and use.
Within these sub-sections a number of issues associated with output-related funding
will be discussed.  At the end of the section, the discussion will be summarised by
posing a series of policy questions to be considered when evaluating and assessing
ORF regimes.
In this section, the discussion takes place in the abstract and makes no judgements
about the very different VET funding systems across the EU. The points made below
are general issues associated with output-related funding, which could vary according
to individual VET systems and the policies and programmes which govern them.
1.4 What is Output-Related Funding?
There are three main activities or events to which the funding of vocational education
and training (VET) can be related:
· enrolment (sometimes called ‘starts’ or ‘entries’)
· the duration and nature of programmes (i.e. course length, attendance
requirements and infrastructure needs)
· the outputs produced (usually measured in terms of qualifications achievement for
school-based training and/or job attainment with regard to labour market training)
Output-related funding (ORF) refers to the last of these mechanisms.  It can be used
singularly or in combination with the other two.
All three mechanisms are related in some way to the performance of training
institutions, measured in terms of enrolment, attendance or attainment.  Hence, the use
of the term performance-related funding can sometimes lead to confusion.  Indeed,
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several experts consulted for this project conceived performance-related funding in
such an all-encompassing way.  This Report, therefore, avoids using this term
wherever possible.  Having said this, it is important to note that the term is commonly
used in the US literature (see Section Three below) to refer to what this report calls
ORF.
For this Report, output-related funding is defined as funding which is linked in some
way to a pre-defined ‘successful’ and ‘measurable’ output of the VET system.  What
might constitute a ‘successful’ and ‘measurable’ output to the training system is
discussed in more detail below.
It is important to point out that an ORF mechanism is unlikely to be introduced as a
single measure; rather, it will be the result of other reforms and changes to the VET
structure and funding regime.  As it operates on the supply side, it will usually be
introduced as part of a package of measures aimed at improving the delivery of training
by decentralising the management of programmes and resources to those nearer the
point of delivery.  As a result, ORF is often used as a means of ensuring that those
charged with administering government programmes (whether private or public sector
organisations) are financially accountable for the success, or otherwise, of the
outcomes delivered.  In other words, ORF is often used as a means of monitoring
performance and ensuring accountability.
1.5 What is its Rationale?
In general terms, the rationale behind introducing output-related funding is to create an
incentive-based funding mechanism which aims to improve (or discourage) certain pre-
defined outputs as a means to reward, or penalise, training institutions.  Within this
general principle there are more specific ones which depend on individual VET
systems and the relationships between the various stakeholders.
Nevertheless, the arguments in favour of ORF have widespread applicability, which
may appeal to those concerned with ‘training’ issues as well as to those concerned with
‘funding’.  It is worth rehearsing these in some detail at this point, so that policy-makers
can balance the potential benefits against the possible costs ORF may bring.
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1.5.1 ORF as an incentive to improve efficiency
By making a proportion of a training institution’s budget dependent on the achievement
of a particular output(s), an incentive is immediately created for institutions to improve
or change certain aspects of their training policies in order to increase their chance of
generating the desired output(s).  Depending on the definition of output, this could
include focusing on the quality of the training delivered and/or the assessment and
guidance offered to trainees prior to, or after, training.  By re-focusing and re-assessing
certain aspects of the training process, the efficiency of the whole training system may
be enhanced.  For example, more emphasis could be placed on placing trainees in
appropriate courses where they will have a reasonable chance of success, closely
monitoring their progress, and taking quick corrective action when a trainee is
underachieving or exhibits an inclination to drop out.  Furthermore, provided the output-
related funding regime is correctly weighted to maximise achievement and support
training for those with special needs, ORF can offer training providers financial
inducements to take on trainees with special needs and provide an incentive to stretch
all trainees to their fullest potential.
In addition, funding on the basis of training weeks can encourage stakeholders to think
in terms of time-serving, and can be an incentive to training providers to retain trainees
for an unnecessarily long time.  Paying for outcomes, on the other hand, gives an
incentive to reduce training time to the point necessary for trainees to achieve the
‘output’, whether this is concerned with gaining a qualification and/or obtaining
employment.  It also means that training provider income is geared to success.  If  a
trainee leaves earlier than expected, but gains an outcome, the training provider’s
income is not affected.  Conversely, lengthy training times are not rewarded.
1.5.2 ORF as a means of enhancing flexibility
Linking funding to outcomes could provide an incentive for training providers to offer a
broader and more flexible range of training options.  Providers could opt for a long, low-
cost-per-week solution, or a short, high-cost-per-week arrangement, with the same
overall financial effects; the ability to do this will depend on existing regulations
regarding the time spent in training.  Nevertheless, the flexibility inherent in an ORF
model might be of benefit to all concerned: to trainees whose training can be more
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closely tailored to their needs; to training providers designing programmes; and to
programme administrators, who can better match training and labour market needs and
trainees’ aspirations.
1.5.3 ORF as a means of reducing administrative costs and bureaucracy
Detailed attendance records on all participants are required if funding is tied to the time
spent in training.  This means that considerable resources are devoted to the
collection, monitoring, and auditing of attendance records; such resources might be
better spent on delivering the training itself.  A process-based funding system,
therefore, might be costly to maintain, complex, and open to abuse.  One of the
potential benefits of ORF is that it can be used to simplify administrative systems, help
to develop clearer audit paths, and hence enhance provider accountability.  The
volume of data to be checked under an outcomes regime is potentially more
manageable and the documentary evidence required is for discernible one-off events.
This can release resources to be used for training delivery.
1.5.4 ORF as a means of improving transparency and accountability
Last but not least, ORF provides a financial incentive to fulfil certain achievements and
therefore provides a mechanism for policy-makers to emphasise the delivery of the
outputs they consider essential.  This could mean adding to the overall stock of
qualifications held by the workforce or getting people into jobs.  Tying funding directly
to these policy goals can make these training objectives and their achievement more
transparent, and therefore makes the parties involved more accountable.
1.6 Operational Issues
The introduction of ORF requires that a number of operational issues be dealt with
before the potential benefits outlined above can be realised.  Again, these issues will
largely depend on the way in which individual funding and training systems are
structured.  However, some general points can be made.
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1.6.1 ORF mechanisms
Although the principle of ORF is straightforward, it is rarely used in its purest form, i.e.
funding for outputs only, for a number of reasons outlined further below.  Instead, ORF
is used in combination with enrolment- and attendance-based funding; these are often
referred to as ‘starts and outcomes’ and ‘weeks and outcomes’ regimes.  In both cases
funding is split into two parts.  Under the ‘starts and outcomes’ regime, one part of the
payment is triggered by each trainee who enrols in the programme, while the other is
due for each trainee who exits the programme with a particular outcome.  The ‘weeks
and outcomes’ regime maintains a stronger link with the process of training, where
payment is based on trainee attendance as well as trainee performance on completion.
Under either regime the emphasis given to ORF can vary.  Indeed, as Section Three
shows, the UK gives significantly more emphasis to ORF than the US.  Moreover, the
tendency in the UK has been to tilt the balance even further in the direction of ORF in
order to maximise the potential benefits it brings.  This raises the question of the
optimal balance between input-related and output-related funding that maximises the
potential benefits of ORF (some of these have been outlined above), while minimising
its associated costs (these are outlined further below).
1.6.2 Institutional structure
It should be noted that the funding chain between government and training provider is
often mediated by other organisations.  This means that ORF contracts between
government and training intermediaries need not be passed on in full, or even in part,
to training providers.  ORF, therefore, needs to be studied at various points along the
contractual chain, as it cannot be assumed that agreements reached at one level are
automatically passed on unchanged or unmodified to those further down.  This point is
made in more detail in the case studies contained in Section Three.
1.6.3 Defining a successful output
A key operational issue is:  What is defined as a ‘successful’ output?  While this might
be politically determined, one can single out two major outputs commonly sought from
government-funded VET.  First, the acquisition of skills as shown by qualification
attainment; this can refer to the grade/level achieved, the number of certificates
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awarded and/or the area of study.  Second, output may be defined, in both initial
training and training for the unemployed, simply as getting trainees into jobs.
1.6.4 Measuring a successful output
Associated with this operational issue is how outputs, once defined, are measured.  In
principle, there are three ways of doing so: ‘absolute’, ‘relative’ and ‘value-added’
measures.  The ‘absolute’ measure takes no account whatsoever of the quality of
intake; that is to say, institutions are measured according to the outputs they achieve,
regardless of the quality of the recruits they are able to attract.  The second, ‘relative’
measure is designed to reward enhanced provider performance by linking funding to
improvements training providers are able to make to their past performance.  However,
neither an absolute nor a relative measure links inputs to outputs.  The third measure -
‘value-added’ - attempts to achieve this feat, thereby isolating the contribution training
providers alone make to output.  This can be achieved by comparing ‘the
characteristics and attainment of learners at entry (the input data) and their
achievements at exit (the output data)’ (Further Education Unit, 1993, quoted in Further
Education Development Agency, 1995: 1).  In practice, this means finding an indicator
which acts as an approximation for every training participant’s ‘input’ value into the
training process and establishing whether the process of training leads to higher
‘output’ value, i.e. the value added to the stock of human capital.  Such a measure,
therefore, aims to identify the expected output of the training process, given that there
are differences in input levels.  This ensures that the achievement of a ‘successful’
output is within the ability of every training institution, since success is measured by the
difference between inputs and outputs.
1.6.5 Funding an ORF regime
Another key operational issue is how the regime is to be funded.  One of the central
advantages of the system of ORF is that it encourages training providers to achieve
increasingly better outputs.  However, this raises difficulties from a funding perspective,
since public expenditure commitments will also rise (fall) in line with increased
(decreased)  training provider performance.  One way of countering funding uncertainty
is to place a ceiling on the payments that can be made to training providers, thereby
capping funding at a certain level.  However, there is a trade-off between giving training
providers greater financial incentives to do well and knowing with some certainty what
- 20 -
is likely to be spent.  Inevitably, a compromise between these two positions has to be
reached before ORF can become operational.
1.7 Some Consequences and Implications of ORF
Like other funding mechanisms, ORF can have a number of consequences when put
into practice.  Many of these are revealed by the evaluations reviewed in Section Three
- some have led to modifications of the ORF regime, others have even prompted
institutional reform.  It is, therefore, worth considering, albeit briefly, the possible
consequences and implications of ORF in relation to its potential benefits in the
abstract before considering them in real-world situations in Section Three.  Again,
these consequences and implications will depend on the existing policies and
regulations concerning individual training and funding structures.
1.7.1 ORF: efficiency and equity?
· Measuring short-term performance
 
 The system of ORF usually rests on observed outcomes shortly after the completion of
a training programme.  This is partly due to the nature of recurrent funding and the
need to minimise the time-lag between training delivery and the receipt of payment (i.e.
cash flow).  Definitions of successful outputs include participants in work at a
designated week after graduation, their weekly earnings that week or the number of
hours worked during that week.  However, these are short-term indicators of
performance and may be poor proxies for the evaluation of the long-term benefits of
investment in human resources.  In other words, training programmes may temporarily
raise the labour market prospects of those who participate, but the advantage they gain
may quickly disappear.  Rewarding training providers for longer-term effects, however,
is likely to lead to measurement and cash flow difficulties. Measuring output on the
basis of short-term indicators might affect the long-term efficiency of the funding and
training system.
 
· ‘Creaming’ and ‘dredging’
 
 Operators may react to ORF by enrolling only those most likely to meet the output
criteria, i.e. they will ‘cream’.  This is more probable in cases where the applicant pool
is much larger than the available places and hence the scope for selection is
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enhanced.  Similarly, under conditions of limited resources, the tendency is to ‘cream’.
On the other hand, this issue is less of a problem where the applicant pool is small and
resources are more readily available.  This means that when there is a large and
diverse pool of eligible participants, screening by training providers can be undertaken
to identify promising candidates, while weeding out those who might be more
troublesome.  Those with special needs are the most likely to be excluded.
 
 In economic literature this is referred to as the problem of ‘moral hazard’ or ‘the folly of
rewarding A, while hoping for B’.  Moral hazard occurs when A and B diverge.  This is a
common problem in subcontracting arrangements which require the subcontractor to
provide a service rather than a tangible product to another group of individuals.  The
provision of government-funded training is one such example.  If the goal is to enhance
someone’s employment chances, then the output indicator needs to be able to
measure this effect of the training, rather than encouraging training providers to screen
for those with better prospects which would exist regardless of the training.  A value-
added measure of output, as well as other institutional reforms, may be used to counter
creaming.
 
 On the other hand, programme objectives may be set to extend rather than limit
training opportunities to the most disadvantaged in society.  In these circumstances,
there is no ‘floor’ to the selection criteria; however, there is a ‘ceiling’ beyond which
participation is not permitted.  The ‘ceiling’ could be defined by education levels,
income or previous employment.  As a result, only the most disadvantaged form the
available pool from which selection takes place.  This practice is termed ‘dredging’ and
is usually justified for reasons of equity.  In so far as government training schemes
have eligibility criteria, dredging, by definition, can be said to operate.  However, the
narrower the eligibility criteria, the greater the extent of dredging required by policy-
makers.  Moreover, the criteria can be changed to refocus training activity on those
most in need, thereby minimising the extent of creaming.
 
· Altering patterns of participation
As a result of creaming, it is often alleged that ORF alters the pattern of participation
and shifts provision away from the most disadvantaged groups in society.  Notable
among the ‘losers’ are women, ethnic minorities, the poorly educated and those with
special needs.  However, ORF mechanisms themselves may be designed to counter
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this tendency by, for example, attaching more funds to outputs attained by
disadvantaged groups, i.e. dredging, as discussed above.
1.7.2 ORF: enhancing flexibility?
· Encouraging/discouraging certain types of training
 
 In funding systems which take no account of the variable costs of training for different
occupations, training provision may shift towards ‘low cost’ forms of training such as
business administration and away from ‘high cost’ areas such as engineering.
Participants may also be steered away from more difficult programmes and placed in
courses for which it is easier to demonstrate ‘success’ according to the output criteria.
This shift may occur regardless of the skills and training demands of employers, and
therefore the qualifications gained may be inappropriate.  ORF regimes, however, may
be weighted to counter this tendency, with more costly or more ‘necessary’ training
carrying higher output funding.
 
· Changing the content of training
 
 The content of training may change as a result of ORF depending on the way in which
‘output’ is defined.  For example, where ORF is linked to job placement, then on-the-job
training and job search assistance may be more effective and quicker in placing people
into jobs than, for example, classroom-based training.  Shifts in the content of training
are therefore likely.  Training times, too, may change.  If funding is no longer attached
to the process of training, then there are economic incentives to reduce the length of
courses, prompting accusations of quality dilution.  However, it could be argued that
the ability to alter both the length and content of courses may lead to a more efficient
use of scarce resources.
 
· Creating cash flow problems
 
 ORF may lead to cash flow problems among training providers whose costs are
incurred on an on-going basis but whose income is uncertain and ‘lumpy’; expenditure
and income may not be well aligned over time.  Estimating when trainees will achieve
outcomes may not be easy, and the assessment and verification of outcomes may
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increase the uncertainty of funding triggers being reached.  This problem will be even
greater for occupations commonly regarded as requiring ‘high cost’ training, such as
engineering.  The higher the level of ORF, the greater these problems may become.
 
· Threatening/protecting some types of training provider
Certain types of training provider may respond more quickly to the ORF regime than
others.  Providers whose main activity is the provision of training on a commercial basis
may be quicker and less reluctant to rid themselves of occupational areas and types of
trainees in which, and for whom, it is difficult and costly to trigger ORF payments.
Other providers (such as employers and industry associations) may continue to provide
such training, but only by cross-subsidisation from their other activities.  Specialist
providers, on the other hand, may suffer greater financial pressure and may, therefore,
be forced to exit the market altogether.
In addition, an increased emphasis on funding outputs may act as a barrier to entry for
new providers.  Unlike existing ones, they will not have a stream of outputs arising from
trainees who have started earlier, so the cash flow problem for them is likely to be even
more acute.  This will raise barriers to entry and reduce levels of competition faced by
existing training providers.  Flexibility in the short-term might, therefore, reduce the
breadth of provision in the long-term.
1.7.3 ORF: reducing administrative costs and bureaucracy?
It is often claimed that ORF can reduce administrative costs and bureaucracy.
However, this is by no means certain, due to the implications of addressing some of the
negative consequences of ORF through the ORF mechanism itself.  For example, the
ORF mechanism adopted may be complicated by the desire to make the system more
equitable by recognising, for example, that not all trainees start with the same human
capital endowments.  As a result, the same output may trigger different payments
depending on the background of trainees.  This may require pre-training verification
and therefore add to the administration and bureaucracy of the system.  Similarly,
rewarding part outputs or a ‘basket’ of outputs will add to the number of outputs that
need to be monitored and rewarded.
1.7.4 ORF: enhancing transparency and accountability?
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· Appearing to add value
 
 A training programme creates value when, as a result of training, a participant’s
prospects in the labour market exceed what they would have been in the absence of
such an intervention, i.e., when the programme adds to the stock of human capital, as
discussed above.  However, observing a trainee’s prospects ‘before’ training and
his/her prospects ‘after’ training does not necessarily indicate value-added.  Other
confounding variables (not always observable to the evaluator) also determine labour
market (and qualification) prospects.  These can range from situational factors such as
access to transportation to attitudinal factors such as motivation and attitudes to
training and/or work as well as the labour market context.  Furthermore, the mix of
participants in the training programme can influence how training programmes appear
to fare.  For example, a programme consisting of large numbers of high-potential
participants will fare much better than one consisting largely of participants with low
potential, irrespective of the quality of the training intervention.  In other words, ORF
contracts may encourage contractors to create the appearance of valuable training
without actually producing real changes in the clients they serve, even when value-
added measures of output are used, thereby distorting the transparency of the
input/output relationship.
 
· Failing to reward all aspects of value added
 
 On the other hand, output-related funding may not reward all the additions training
makes to a person’s stock of human capital.  This is especially the case where some
progress has been made towards a particular performance goal, but the candidate has
just fallen short of it.  A good example here are systems which fund training providers
on the basis of candidates who achieve a qualification.  There may be cases where
candidates are not able to complete the entire qualification for one reason or another,
but who nonetheless attain part of the qualification.  In addition, the value added
through training may be multi-dimensional, which may not be captured in the definition
of output.  As a result, the ORF regime may not recognise all of the ways in which the
stock of human capital can increase.
 
· Bending the rules
Financial probity and reliability can be compromised by ORF unless certain checks and
balances are instituted.  A training organisation whose aim is the promotion of learning,
and which searches out income for that purpose, or which has strong links with an
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industry and its traditions, may value its reputation sufficiently to overcome any
temptation to ‘bend’ in order to secure output-related funds.  However, other
organisations might be more vulnerable to these pressures.  For example, linking
funding to qualification attainment where training providers are involved in the
assessment process may lead to a conflict of interest where the training provider could
lower the assessment criteria in order to secure output-related funds.  Linking funding
to job placements can also be open to abuse, with training providers providing trainees
with fictitious employment in order to trigger payment.  This danger is further enhanced
in situations where providers have responsibility for all three parts of the process - that
is, recruitment of participants, the training programme and job placements.  In addition,
incentives to bend the rules may be stronger where the proportion of funding
dependent on reaching output triggers is high.  If such potential exists then the
principles of transparency and accountability may become blurred.
1.8 Summary
This section has highlighted the benefits of ORF.  These can be summarised as
providing an incentive to encourage:
· more flexibility in the type of training provision offered
· improvements in performance
· increasing value for money by providing an incentive to fulfil certain achievements
and discouraging ‘time-serving’ in training which do not lead to outcomes
· simplifying administration and clarifying audit requirements
 
 Set against these benefits are a number of operational issues which need to be tackled
before ORF can be introduced, as well as a number of consequences and implications
which can arise from its implementation and use.  These can be summarised in a
series of policy questions:
 
· What level of ORF is required to reap the optimum benefits of tying funding to
output?
· Is ORF passed on to all those in the contracting chain?
· How is output defined?
· How is output measured?
· How are funding uncertainties minimised?
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· Do the measures of performance used to financially reward and penalise training
providers act as good proxies for the long-term labour market prospects of
trainees?
· Are only the best candidates ‘creamed off’ to output-related-funded programmes?
· To what extent are eligibility criteria used to counter the danger of ‘creaming’ by
requiring training providers to ‘dredge’?
· How is the participation of disadvantaged members of the labour market protected?
· What consequences does ORF have for the content and occupational spread of
training provision?
· Does ORF lead to cash flow problems among training providers?
· Are particular types of training provider more at risk than others from the operation
of ORF?
· Does ORF raise barriers to entry for new training providers?
· Are the administrative rules and regulations that accompany ORF simpler or more
complicated than other systems?
· Does ORF reward the value added by training intervention?
· Does ORF reward all or only some of the value added by training providers?
· What checks and balances are in place to ensure probity and reliability?
· What mechanisms are used to counter these problems?
· How successful is ORF in achieving its aims?
Equipped with this broad overview, we now turn to a number of real world examples of
the use of ORF within and beyond the EU.
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SECTION THREE:
CASE STUDIES OF OUTPUT-RELATED FUNDING
During the course of this project, considerable effort was devoted to the identification of
countries both within and outside of the EU which are using, or have had experience of,
ORF for VET programmes.  The result of these searches and enquiries confirmed our
original suspicions that the US and the UK offered the best examples of its usage, with
only piecemeal usage elsewhere in the EU.  Indeed, the UK government, wishing to
learn from international experience of ORF, commissioned a study in 1993 to review
ORF in six countries - France, Germany, Sweden, Australia, Canada and the US
(Green et al., 1993: 3)  Tellingly, only the US was able to offer any pointers for the
development of ORF.  Our own enquiries for this study revealed much the same.
In the case of the US, ORF has been in use since the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) of 1982.  This was designed to create an outcomes-driven training programme
for the disadvantaged, which would demonstrate measurable results and do so without
excessive costs.  The UK’s use of ORF can be dated from the early 1990s and the
establishment of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) to administer government-
funded training programmes.  The UK and the US, therefore, provide the two most
obvious examples of ORF in practice, not least because there is a considerable
descriptive and evaluative literature on its operation in both countries.  This section of
the Report will summarise this material in the light of the policy issues raised earlier.
The striking feature of the review is the finding that the British emphasis on ORF as a
tool of performance management is much stronger than that of the country in which the
concept originated.  In addition, this section will provide information on the issues
facing those Member States - such as the Netherlands - which plan to introduce ORF
in the near future; this section is divided accordingly.

- 29 -
1.9 ORF in the United Kingdom
1.9.1 Rationale and Operation
A network of 82 Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) covering England and Wales
was established in 1991.1  They were set up as locally-based and employer-led
institutions charged with contracting with government ‘to plan and deliver training and
to promote and support the development of small business and self-employment within
their area’ (Department of Employment, 1988: para 5.7).  In 1998, the number of TECs
had fallen to 78 due to two mergers, one declared bankruptcy, and one closure
(Cobbold and Martin, 1997; Times Higher Educational Supplement, 21 November
1997).
The majority of TECs’ funding comes from training programmes; around 5% comes
from employers and individuals, about 1.5% from the EU, with the rest coming from
central government (House of Commons, 1996: xxxvi).  Three-quarters of this goes to
fund training for young people entering the labour market for the first time (initial
training) and for those seeking to re-enter the labour market after a period of
unemployment (the dislocated).
These schemes are Youth Training (YT), which caters for 16-17 year olds who have
left school, and Training for Work (TfW) which caters for workers aged 18-63 years old
who have been unemployed for six months or more.  YT is aimed at providing young
people with vocational qualifications at or above National Vocational Qualification
(NVQ) level 22, whereas TfW is designed to get the unemployed back into work and/or
improve their vocational skills.  Young people gain access to YT through the Youth
Credit (YC) system, in which public funding is routed through the individual young
person rather than the training provider in an attempt to empower the learner (see
Felstead, 1993; Youthaid, 1997).  However, the YT programme itself and the
contractual relationships which surround it are the same.  As a further complication,
                                               
1  At the same time, 22 Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) covering Scotland were established.  Since
LECs have a much wider remit covering environmental, community and local economic development
issues in addition to TEC-like responsibilities for the local implementation of national training and
enterprise programmes, the discussion will focus on TECs.
2  NVQs are awarded at five levels.  These range from NVQ level 1 at the bottom to NVQ level 5 at the
top.  Government-funded training schemes, in the main, focus on providing training at NVQ level 2 and
NVQ level 3.  Level 2 refers to basic entry qualifications for employment, while level 3 is pitched at
craft/intermediate employment (see Felstead, 1997).
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young people can also enrol in a Modern Apprenticeship (MA) which takes as its basic
aim the achievement of NVQ level 3.
The function  and institutional set up of TECs makes them hybrid organisations.  While
they are private organisations which deliver public services paid for by the taxpayer,
they are different from a private commercial company working under contract to
government - in this case the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE).
While their formal responsibilities are the same as those of any other private company,
they operate on a not-for-profit basis which prevents any surpluses generated from
being dispersed to shareholders.  Instead, surpluses can only be spent on activities
considered important for the area, or else carried over into the next financial year
(Jones, 1995).
In addition to the principle that TECs must be locally-based and employer-led, there
was a third condition - they must stand or fall on their own performance.  This principle
is the one most relevant for this Report.  In the then government’s words, this meant
‘attaining better value for money, greater efficiency and a higher return on investment’
(Training Agency, 1989b: 4).  There are several inter-related ways in which the TEC
system is designed to achieve this aim; the most visible is the annual publication of
TEC performance league tables.  The institutional and ORF framework within which
TECs operate is set out at Figure 1 below:
The delivery of government-funded training by TECs is measured according to six
criteria (Performance Indicators and Analysis Unit, 1997).
For Youth Training (YT) the criteria are:
Figure 1: Institutional Framework of TEC Network
Department for Education and Employment
(DfEE)
½
Contractual arrangements, training programmes agreed,
output targets set and ORF regime.
¯
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)
½
As above, although output targets may differ.
¯
Training Providers
(Youth Training, Training for Work)
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· cost per output point (each NVQ achieved carries output points)
· number of output points per 100 leavers
· number of qualifications gained per 100 leavers
 
 For Training for Work (TfW) the criteria are:
· cost per output point (points here are awarded according to NVQ level and jobs or
places on full-time education courses)
· number of jobs acquired per 100 leavers
· number of qualifications gained per 100 leavers
Thus the output criteria for YT and TfW include the number of qualifications, the level of
qualifications and job placement rates.  They are compiled in the Inter-TEC
Comparison Tables and are published every September.  This allows the government
to identify high- and low-achieving TECs.
Increasing competition among training providers is designed to enhance efficiency
gains - ORF being one of the means of doing so.  Other means are also deployed.
Every year TECs bid for funding based on the volume of training (measured by training
weeks, on-programme payments or starts/enrolments), the number of qualifications
and jobs (outputs) they expect to deliver, and the total cost of doing so.  Separate bids
are made for YT and TfW (as well as for enterprise programmes not discussed here)
and are outlined in an annual Business Plan (Training Agency, 1989a: 25-26).  The
Business Plan quantifies the plan for both training programmes including:  the number
and type of trainees catered for; estimated costs; broad plans for the distribution of
training by occupation; and the performance level the TEC expects to reach for each
programme.  The DfEE then negotiates with each TEC on the volumes, outputs and
prices contained in the bid.  Following this process, agreed volumes, outputs and a
total contract price are written into the TEC’s Business Plan for the forthcoming year.
The total contract price is divided into two parts:  payment for specified volumes of
training and payment for specified outputs.  The total contract price has a ceiling, as do
volume and output payments.  In other words, those who exceed their contractual
requirements do not receive extra funding; however, those who fall short of their
contractual obligations suffer financially.
The TEC receives payment upon production of the relevant documentation.  This can
take a number of forms: attendance records are needed if funding is tied to the number
- 32 -
of training weeks; a signed declaration confirming that an Individual Training Plan has
been agreed is required if volume payments are made according to the number of
programme starts; and written confirmation of trainee participation is needed if volume
is measured according to the number of trainees on-programme on specified dates
each month.  Output payments, too, can only be triggered by the relevant documentary
evidence.  This includes written notification from the Awarding Body that a qualification
has been awarded, an employer’s letter confirming that a former trainee has been in
full-time work for at least 7 days within 13 weeks of leaving the programme or
documentary evidence of enrolment on a full-time education course within 52 weeks of
exit (DfEE, 1997c: 12-15 and 23).
Payments for volumes are relatively simple - TECs supply DfEE with the relevant
documentation and are paid the agreed rate.  However, paying for outputs is more
complicated as not all outputs are treated in the same way; certain outputs take longer
and are more difficult to achieve than others.  For example,  under the 1997-1998
arrangements, a YT trainee achieving an NVQ level 3 triggers two-and-a-half times the
payment triggered by someone achieving level 2.  Similarly, TfW trainees who get a job
within 13 weeks of leaving the programme trigger output payments double those
triggered by trainees who go onto full-time education or those who get NVQ level 2
(DfEE, 1997d: 32 and 51).
The funding arrangements also incorporate some allowances for those with Special
Training Needs (STNs) who, by definition, require longer to achieve the same results
as those in the ‘mainstream’.  On YT those endorsed as having no realistic prospect of
achieving NVQ level 2 are allowed to follow a programme leading towards level 1
which, once awarded, carries a payment one-and-a-half times the payment a
‘mainstream’ trainee triggers on achieving NVQ level 2.  Those with literacy and
numeracy difficulties can follow specific non-NVQ courses designed to improve their
basic skills in these areas.  Once achieved, these trigger the same payments as
triggered by YT ‘mainstreamers’ on the level 2 route.  However, level 2 and above
qualifications carry the same payments irrespective of trainee background (DfEE,
1997d: 32).  Similarly, concessions are made for trainees with literacy and numeracy
difficulties who enrol on TfW.  However, no other allowances are made for those TfW
trainees with STNs - an NVQ or a job carries the same payment (and number of points)
whatever the trainee’s background (DfEE, 1997d: 51).
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As outlined above, the ORF funding system for TECs in the UK is a complicated one,
so as to recognise that trainees may not all start with the same skills, and that
achievement of a particular output for some represents more of an achievement than
for others, i.e., it attempts to reward value-added.  However, whether this is sufficient to
take all the major aspects of value-added into account is another issue.  This reveals
that there is policy dilemma between a complex measure of output which is equitable,
and one which is simple and less equitable but easier to administer.
Detail apart, the balance between paying for training volume and paying for outputs
has been shifting ever since the TECs were first set up.  More and more emphasis has
been given to payment by results.  Initially, output-related funding contributed to
approximately 10% of TEC budgets, but has since crept up to around 25% in 1992-
1993 and reached between 25-40% in 1993-1994 (Ball, 1993: 10).  The shift in
emphasis has continued.  Today, ORF accounts for 25-35% of TECs’ YT budget and at
least 75% of TfW funding (DfEE, 1997d: 22 and 49).  The continued and increased
emphasis on ORF of government-funded training has occasioned much debate and
many evaluations of its consequences.  It is to these that we now turn.
1.9.2 Evaluation
It is widely acknowledged that ORF can be a useful means of focusing TECs and their
training providers on securing effective outcomes from taxpayers’ money.  However, a
number of studies have raised serious concerns about how the system has developed
in practice (some of these are summarised in House of Commons, 1996: Part IV).
One such study was undertaken by Coopers and Lybrand (1995) who carried out an
evaluation of a pilot funding scheme for Training for Work (TfW).  This exercise
involved an assessment of the consequences of changing the way in which TECs
received their funding through, in particular, giving even more emphasis to ORF.  The
evaluation centred on seven TECs which agreed to pilot a new funding formula,
whereby 25% of their training fees were paid per TfW trainee starter with the remaining
75% paid according to each ‘successful’ completion of the programme (i.e. on trainees
getting a job, becoming self-employed, entering full-time education or attaining a
recognised qualification).  This funding arrangement was almost a complete reversal of
the mechanism in place at that time, where it was customary to pay 75% of the training
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fee for the number of training weeks completed with only 25% held back to reward
‘successful’ completion (Employment Department, 1993).
The evaluation was designed to assess the effect that these new arrangements had on
the efficiency of the TfW programme.  Two methods were used: an analysis of the
statistical data relating to the seven pilot TECs and their comparators (selected on the
basis of broad equivalence in terms of their economies, labour markets, size and
performance); and a series of interviews with TEC officials, four or five training
providers and up to two Employment Service offices in each area.
According to the government’s interpretation of the evaluation, the results of the pilot
funding scheme were very good, producing significant increases in both the number of
jobs and qualifications achieved by trainees.  The Employment Department said that
‘positive outcomes per 100 leavers in the pilot TECs improved from 15 in 1992/93 to 40
in 1994/95.   Comparable figures for non-pilot TECs were 16 and 27.  So from similar
bases, pilots have improved by 25 percentage points compared to the 11 percentage
points of the non-pilots’ (Employment Department, 1995b: 4).  The evaluation report
itself, however, was less sanguine about the success of this shift in funding emphasis.
It suggested that most of the improvements were the result of factors, at best, only
partially related or, at worst, wholly unrelated to the funding regime (Coopers and
Lybrand, 1995: 37-39).  For example, pilot TECs were allowed to record ‘positive
outcomes’ - that is, those getting jobs or going onto full-time education - and claim ORF
payments at any time during the 13 week period rather than on a particular spot date in
week 13.  As a consequence, the report concluded that:
‘the improvement in recorded performance ... is primarily due to the
earlier and more accurate reporting of the performance that is actually
being achieved, whereas at non-pilots much of the performance goes
unreported and unrecorded’ (ibid: 18; my emphasis).
In other words, by placing a greater emphasis on the proportion of funding allocated
according to output levels, there was a greater financial incentive to monitor outcomes
more effectively.
Coopers and Lybrand (1995) also found that placing more emphasis on ORF further
shifts the focus of training activity toward meeting short-term labour market needs
rather than equipping trainees with the skills necessary for long-term employability.
This was revealed in a number of ways.  The study found that in the pilot areas,
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increased attention was focused on the highest-performing courses - leading some to
reduce or even close down training provision which did not quickly lead to jobs.  In
addition, a shift away from ‘high cost’ and/or long duration courses towards ‘low cost’
and/or short courses was detected.  The evaluation also pointed out that the enhanced
ORF regime made it more difficult for new providers to enter the market, especially in
occupations commonly regarded as ‘high cost’ training areas.  Signs were already
evident that the provider network was shrinking, thereby reducing the range and choice
of provision as well as the intensity of competition between providers.  Finally, the
study revealed that the pilot areas were more selective in their recruitment - for
example, there was tendency for pilot TECs to recruit trainees from the more job-ready
section of those eligible for the programme at the expense of those needing additional
help, i.e. to ‘cream’.  (Coopers and Lybrand, 1995: 34, 52).
Specific research into the consequences which ORF has for the training of those with
Special Training Needs (STNs) has also been carried out (Meager, 1995).  The data for
this particular study come from two postal surveys.  One focused on the entire TEC
network and the other focused on a sample of 200 training providers, many of whom
specialised in catering for the disadvantaged.  Both had a response rate of around
65%, yielding information on 53 TECs and 126 training providers.  The study was
conducted on behalf of a consortium of TECs and training providers with a particular
interest in STNs.
Several points of relevance to this Report emerge from the study.  First, although a flat
rate fee is paid to each TEC irrespective of the type of YT trainee or the training
occupation (see above), TECs themselves can and do offer differential pricing to their
YT providers (also see Felstead, 1994; Felstead et al., 1994).  In 1995-1996, for
example, two-thirds of TECs surveyed paid different volume prices to providers
according to type of trainee and/or training programme.  A third of these paid higher
prices to training providers who took on trainees with STNs than to those catering for
‘mainstreamers’ (Meager, 1995: 48; see also Employment Department, 1995a and
DfEE, 1996).  These types of volume contracts appear to be on the decline - they were
offered by 73% of TECs in 1994-1995 compared to 67% a year later.  A continuation of
this trend is likely to make it increasingly difficult to offer YT to those with STNs since
they are, by definition, a client group who are more difficult to train.  The same principle
applies to particular occupations - such as engineering - where it is more expensive to
deliver training because of the cost of equipment, materials and trainers’ time.
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Secondly, TECs and providers were asked about the degree to which ORF is included
in YT contracts, and the extent to which it varied between different types of provision.
Here, there was much less variation.  Around four out of five TECs offered no variation
whatsoever in the payments they made to training providers for the outputs delivered
whatever the type of trainee or occupational area.  However, 15% of TECs reported
varying payments according to trainee type, with another 6% varying payments
according to occupational area (Meager, 1995: 51).  These variations take the form of
higher payments for some outcomes if trainees are designated as having STNs.  Also,
some TECs do pay more for qualifications in certain ‘high cost’ occupational areas -
such as engineering (see Felstead, 1994).  It is evident from this that TECs are under
no obligation to pass on the ORF regime set by government to training providers.
Respondents to the STN survey (Meager, 1995) were asked to identify factors which
had an effect on the quality of training provision for those with STNs.  Interestingly for
the purposes of this Report, ORF was frequently mentioned.  Providers tended to see
both ORF per se and the degree of ORF as having a negative impact on STN
provision.
For TECs it was not ORF per se that was problematic, but rather the degree of ORF
(too high) which they felt - as did training providers - was having a negative impact on
provision.  However, not all providers were opposed to the principle of ORF, but some
were concerned about the standardised nature of the outputs recognised for payment
purposes.  One voluntary sector training provider summarised these concerns as
follows:
‘We do not disagree in principle with ORF, and we do not disagree in
principle with TEC quality assurance systems.  The former can be used
to focus objectives and the latter to measure them ... On TfW, however,
we are unhappy that we only get paid for whole NVQs and not for units
towards NVQs ... We would like to see other forms of measures
introduced under TfW ... the main goal, as we see it, is that someone
moves forward, makes progress.  It is not always possible to get
someone from unemployment into a state of employability through one
TfW course, and the ORF regime tends to regard as failures, what may
in reality represent considerable progress for the individual’ (quoted in
Meager, 1995: 103, my emphasis).
This reveals the potential inadequacies of an output measure which fails to record
incremental achievements.  However, as mentioned earlier, this has to be balanced
against the disadvantages of using a more complex measure (such as reducing
transparency and increasing bureaucracy).
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Other studies suggest that ORF may act to the detriment of other groups in society.
For example, the present means of measuring TEC performance makes the launch of
‘positive discrimination’ programmes financially unattractive to TECs (i.e. the provision
of women-only training for occupations in which women are significantly under-
represented).  By their very nature non-traditional training courses are likely to yield
fewer ‘positive outcomes’ per 100 leavers than sex-stereotyped courses, since sexual
stereotyping continues to influence the job recruitment process (Curran, 1988;
Collinson et al., 1990).  In addition, it has been argued that the cost of single-sex
training courses leading to employment in non-traditional occupations is likely to be
high, as they are more likely to be classroom- rather than workplace-based (see
Felstead 1995).
Given these factors, only a few TECs (17%) in 1992 had set up courses for women in
non-traditional areas (EOC, 1993: 31).  As output performance indicators have
assumed a greater importance since that time, it is unlikely that the situation has
improved.  After all, positive action programmes carry the risk of putting downward
pressure on a TEC’s performance rating, which may ultimately threaten its very survival
(for a more detailed discussion see Felstead, 1995).
The high level of ORF in the UK also heightens the likelihood that government funds
may be misappropriated.  With so much at stake, in terms of showing that training has
produced outputs, there is a greater pressure on training providers to cut corners and
even manufacture outcomes (qualifications or jobs).  For example, in some
occupational areas - such as business administration - NVQs can be awarded by
several different bodies, some of which are considered less stringent than others when
it comes to certification.  Furthermore, as Stanton (1996) has pointed out, ORF places
severe strain on the impartiality of the NVQ assessment process which sets out to
attest to the ability of an individual to perform to workplace standards.  This process
relies heavily on the ability and willingness of those in a position to observe an
individual’s workplace performance and make an impartial assessment of it.  Often
these assessors are the individual’s supervisor and/or trainer.  If these assessors are in
circumstances where their incomes (or the resources of the organisation for which they
work) are affected by whether or not they judge a candidate to be competent, then their
impartiality may be compromised.  Some commentators have suggested that
fraudulent claims may result:
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‘Output-related funding encourages people to look for loopholes but it
wouldn’t be such a massive problem if you couldn’t fiddle the results.
The only answer is wholly independent assessors who have no interest
whatsoever in whether a candidate passes or fails’ (Charles Bell,
spokesperson for Article 26, education human rights charity, quoted in
Times Higher Educational Supplement, 14 March 1997).
This suggestion has also been corroborated by a recent survey of 1,057 assessors
which found that 38% felt that ‘many candidates pass who shouldn’t’ (Eraut et al.,
1996: 65; Financial Times, 5 December 1996; Times Higher Educational Supplement,
29 November 1996).
Other fraudulent behaviour has also been identified.  For example, a training provider
with contracts with 13 TECs allegedly claimed training funds aimed at the long-term
unemployed despite the fact that those on the course already had jobs.  The scale of
the alleged  fraud was so serious that it led to the closing down of one of the TECs
concerned (Financial Times, 25/26 October 1997 and 18 November 1997).
Misappropriation of funds has also been uncovered with regard to qualifications
attainment.  Recently, a total of 25 TECs have been ordered to repay funds paid to
them by DfEE for the qualifications generated by a Telford-based motor industry
training provider (Financial Times, 11 November 1997).  There have been other cases
of training providers registering non-existent trainees, double-counting candidates,
inventing courses and placing trainees with ‘friendly’ employers for a short time in order
to trigger output payments related to job placement (People Management, 3 April
1997).
The extent of these irregularities has been the subject of a recent investigation by the
Committee of Public Accounts which estimated that £8.6 million in 1995-1996 was
incorrectly paid by the government to training providers via the TECs (House, of
Commons, 1997: vi).  In response, the government has launched a fraud hotline as
part of a package designed to clamp down on fictitious or inappropriate claims for
funding from training providers (People Management, 19 March 1998).
The Committee of Public Accounts also used the opportunity to highlight one of the
other dangers of ORF:
‘We are concerned that output-related funding may encourage some
providers of offer training which they find easiest and cheapest to
deliver’ (House of Commons, 1997: xiv).
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For example, some occupational areas suffer from high staff turnover, and hence it is
easier to trigger employment-based output payments by placing former trainees in jobs
in these areas.  A training provider for TECs made this point in evidence to the House
of Commons Employment Committee during its investigations into the work of the
TECs (House of Commons, 1996: xlii).  She suggested that placing trainees in
companies with a high turnover of trainees could make it easier for her company to
meet its output requirements, rather than securing long-term employment for the
trainees.  Furthermore, the quality of the job - as measured by its content, pay and the
nature of the employment contract - made no difference whatsoever to her ‘positive
outcome’ payments.  Where the emphasis is on getting trainees into jobs where the
quality of that job is irrelevant (as on the TfW programme), an economic incentive
exists for training providers to seek the quickest, cheapest and easiest routes sufficient
to trigger ORF payments.
Both TECs and training providers are subject to the same pressures.  TECs get paid
the same amount, whether the output achieved is in a ‘low cost’ training area such as
retail or a ‘high cost’ training area such as engineering and whether it is a relatively
high-paying or low-paying job.  In addition, the performance ratings reflect none of
these differences.  Furthermore, TECs are free to allocate any surpluses they generate
(efficiency savings) to activities they wish to promote.  There is, therefore, a financial
incentive, a performance rating incentive and a surplus generation incentive to achieve
outputs in sectors where qualifications or job placements are relatively easy to secure
(e.g. clerical, hairdressing).
An Employment Department study (1994) based on eight sample TECs in three
regions provides evidence to this effect.  For example, in one TEC area the majority of
its outputs were generated from a national private sector organisation specialising in
clerical/business administration training.  At another two TECs, major contributions to
output achievement came from national providers which specialised in clerical and
hairdressing training.  As a result, the training profiles of these TEC areas consisted of
predominantly clerical and hairdressing provision (Employment Department, 1994: para
19).  Skewing provision towards these occupational areas, where training costs are
lower, can enhance the TEC’s financial performance, its value-for-money rating, and its
operating surplus (Jones, 1995 and 1996b) without regard to the long-term needs of
the trainees or the labour market.
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1.9.3 Recent and Future Developments
The principles of ORF can also be seen in other government-funded VET programmes
in the UK.  For example, there is an ORF component in the government’s New Deal
(launched nationally in April 1998) for 18-24 year olds who have been unemployed for
six months or more3.
Those eligible for the New Deal are offered four options: jobs for up to six months with
one day a week off-the-job training leading to a recognised qualification; full-time
education and training for up to 12 months, but only for those not qualified to NVQ level
2; placements lasting up to six months with the Environment Task Force comprising a
minimum of one day a week (or equivalent) training; or work placements with the
voluntary sector on the same terms as for those on the Environment Task Force (DfEE,
1997a).
Interestingly, the provider payment process under each option contains an element of
ORF.  For example, full-time education and training providers receive 20% of their
funding on ‘starts’, 50% on attendance, 20% on achievement of qualifications and 10%
when trainees get a job expected to last more than three months (DfEE, 1997b: 7).  At
least 10% of provider funding under the other non-employer options (Environment Task
Force and other voluntary sector organisations) is also tied to getting trainees into jobs.
In addition, the funds paid to employers for the training component under the
subsidised employment option are tied to outputs.  A third of the £750 government
subsidy available to employers is paid upon the production of an agreed training plan,
another third is paid after the participant has attended for 13 weeks and the remaining
third is paid at the end of the placement, provided the objectives initially identified are
met.
A key element, then, of the new government’s welfare-to-work programme - the New
Deal - is funding tied to outputs.  The principle of ORF is, therefore, firmly rooted in the
UK.  However, the government has recently announced its intention to review the role
of TECs and the contracting and funding arrangements under which they operate
(People Management, 28 May 1998).
                                               
3  As a result, the eligibility criteria for TfW (now Work-Based Training for Adults) has been changed to
cover the 25-63 age group, since 18-24 year olds will be covered by the New Deal.
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1.10 ORF in the United States
1.10.1 Rationale and Operation
There are many similarities between the British TEC system and the US system of funding
federal government training schemes (see Bailey, 1993; Bennett, 1994).  However, the
similarity of greatest significance for this Report is the emphasis the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) places on outputs as the means of securing accountability for the
dispersal of public funds.  Under the JTPA’s predecessor - Comprehensive Employment
Training Act (CETA) - the US Department of Labor (DoL) exercised tight control over
federally funded employment and training efforts.  The DoL contracted with hundreds of
non-profit or local government agencies charged with administering programmes at local
level.  They, in turn, subcontracted programme delivery to a network of training providers.
Administrative control was exercised by regional DoL offices over all those involved in
programme delivery.  The funding emphasis, at this time, was on the numbers enrolled,
the number of days trainees spent in class, certifications granted, and other input and
process measures, since these were all assumed to lead to greater trainee competence,
higher rates of employment and lower welfare demands.  The central assumption
governing the 1982 JTPA reforms was that bureaucratic, process-orientated training policy
had failed, and that an outcome-orientated system of accountability would lead to better
results and greater efficiency.  As one of its architects remarked: ‘the new system will be
based on performance, not process’ (Senator Orrin Hatch, quoted in Donahue, 1989: 6).
Under JTPA Private Industry Councils (PICs)4 run local organisations - Service Delivery
Areas (SDAs) - which administer training programmes in the area.  There are around 650
SDAs, one-third of which cover a population of close to 200,000 - the minimum threshold
announced when SDAs were first set up.  Many SDAs are contained within larger state
agencies, which allows them to combine their relatively small resources with larger local
and state organisations.  SDAs, then, are local administrative units over which PICs have
strategic control.  PICs are, therefore, ultimately responsible for SDA performance.  The
institutional framework under which ORF operates within JTPA is set out in Figure 2
below.
                                               
4 A PIC comprises a majority of private sector members, a private sector chair, and a minority of
representatives from education, labour, community groups and government agencies.  Each PIC has
responsibility for a particular SDA.
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The US experience of performance standards, performance evaluation and ORF has
lessons for European policy-makers who are considering introducing such a market-
orientated or bottom-line approach to their VET delivery, or those who simply wish to learn
more about ORF in practice.  ORF has been used in the US for sixteen years, occasioning
much debate and many evaluations of its consequences along the way.  However, before
considering these in detail, the Report will outline how the JTPA system operates.
Various training initiatives (or Titles) are run under JTPA.  These include: Title II-A
programmes offering training to disadvantaged youth and adults; Title II-B schemes
generally consisting of summer vacation training courses for disadvantaged young people
(aged 14 or over); Title III programmes aimed at displaced workers; and Title IV schemes
providing specific training for Native Americans and migrant and seasonal workers, and
intensive residential programmes mainly for high school dropouts (known as Job Corps).
About a third of the total JTPA budget is spent on Title II-A and around a fifth is spent on
each of the following: Title II-B, Title III and Job Corps (Jones, 1996a).
Figure 2: Institutional Framework of JTPA
Federal Government
(Department of Labor - DoL)
½
Funding based on need.
Performance Standards set.
No ORF.
¯
Individual States
½
As above, but Performance Standards
may be varied to reflect local conditions
and small proportion of budget
may be set aside for ORF payments.
¯
Service Delivery Areas (SDAs)
run by Private Industry Councils (PICs)
½
ORF contracts tied to
Performance Standards.
Widespread use.
¯
Training providers
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Elements of performance management can be found in all of these programmes, but it is
within Title II-A that systems of performance management have been developed furthest.
It is also where most of the prominent evaluations in the field have been carried out (see
below).  Nevertheless, performance management is at the heart of the entire JTPA project
and its associated institutions.  It involves setting performance standards, evaluating
programmes against these measures, and drawing up a series of rewards and sanctions
to be triggered by various parties on the basis of their performance in relation to the
measures.  The emphasis on performance is the centrepiece of the JTPA legislation:
‘The legislation must insist on performance.  The current CETA system
does not have any effective means of measuring program results or
penalizing non-performance.  The new legislation will provide
standards for judging the programs for what they accomplish - by
whether those trained are hired and earn more as a result of training.
It will end federal involvement with the process of how people are
trained.  It will provide for measurement of the outcomes and remove
the Federal government from involvement in the details of program
operations’ (Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
1992, quoted in Bailey, 1993: 10).
The legislation characterises job training as ‘an investment in human capital’, and it directs
the Secretary of Labor to develop ‘criteria for measuring the return on this investment’ and
to translate these criteria into operational standards which SDAs must meet.  Specific
performance criteria for each type of programme are outlined in the legislation.
Originally, performance criteria for adults under Title II-A were:
· placement and retention in unsubsidised employment
· increases in participant earnings
· reduction in the numbers receiving welfare payments and the amounts paid out
 
 For youth they included:
· attainment of ‘employment competitiveness’ as defined locally
· completion of elementary, secondary or post-secondary education
· enrolment in other training programmes, apprenticeships or the armed forces
Additional cost criteria were added to each of these targets.  The legislation vested the
Department of Labor (DoL) with powers to attach standards/targets to each of these aims
and to provide optional models for the adjustment of national standards to take account of
local SDA conditions. These are issued each year by the DoL.  The standards themselves
are set at levels intended to be reached by at least 75% of SDAs.  Hence, some have
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claimed that the ‘performance standards are ridiculously easy to meet’ (Walker et al.,
1986: 26).  In each SDA, state governors are responsible for which standards to adopt -
those set nationally or those modified to take into account local conditions.  In the early
years, most state governors adopted the national standards; today, however, most
evaluate SDA performance against locally modified yardsticks (Green et al., 1993).
The distinctive feature of the US system is that, unlike the British system, performance
management appears to be more unevenly adopted at different levels and entails the use
of various kinds of rewards and sanctions (see Figure 2).  Performance management at
the state level is noticeably absent, with emphasis instead on procedural and regulatory
requirements.  JTPA funding allocations from the federal government are based on the
criterion of need as measured by levels of unemployment and the numbers of
disadvantaged  individuals living in the state.  Once states receive their funds, they must
use the same funding allocation formula to disburse JTPA funds to SDAs (Svorny, 1996:
230).  There are, however, additional regulations governing how the states spend their
JTPA allocations.  For example, under the original legislation 78% of the JTPA II-A
allocation had to be spent directly on training provision, 40% had to go on youth provision,
a maximum of 15% could be spent on administration and a further 6% could be used for
technical assistance to SDAs or for incentive payments.
Further down the chain the rewards and sanctions become less procedural and more
financial in character.  At the SDA level, both are at work.  Here, the state monitors the
performance of each of its SDAs against the performance criteria it has set for them (from
a selection set by the DoL).  If an SDA fails to meet these standards, the state  is required
to offer technical assistance to the troubled locality.  If it misses the mark for two years
running, the state governor and the DoL must impose a reorganisation plan.  This could
involve restructuring the SDA, ‘blacklisting’ offending contractors or assigning authority for
the programme to a completely new entity.  However, the imposition of reorganisation
plans is rare (Green et al., 1993).  In addition to wielding such procedural sanctions over
poor performers, states have the option of rewarding the better performing SDAs with
bonus payments.  The JTPA regulations allow 6% (now 5%) of a state’s allocation to be
spent on special incentive payments of this kind.  However, it is unclear how widespread
this practice is.
Nevertheless, the evaluations of JTPA (see below) suggest that SDAs are influenced by
the performance targets which they are set and that they do respond to the rewards and
sanctions to which they are subject.  However, it is far from clear whether the procedural
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sanctions or the financial rewards are the more dominant force.  Having said this, there are
several factors which cast doubt on the strength of the financial incentive.  Incentive
payments make up only a small percentage of the state funds available for distribution,
SDA funding levels remain protected irrespective of programme performance, and some
states also use the incentive payment fund to provide extra help to those SDAs falling
short of their performance targets.  This is in marked contrast to the British system: local
organisations - TECs - compete against one another for funds, their performance is
monitored nationally with no allowance made for local economic variation, league tables
against national standards are published annually and funding is tied to performance
(under TfW at least three-quarters of funding is dependent on generating outputs).
However, the nearer one gets to the delivery of the training, the greater the emphasis on
ORF becomes.  Yet, the JTPA itself does not stipulate how SDAs should deliver training,
nor does it mention how outside training providers should be funded.  These decisions are
taken by each PIC for the local organisation - the SDA - under its control.  Given the
diversity among the 650 or so SDAs across the US and the considerable leeway they are
permitted to exercise in this area, one might expect to observe a wide range of contrasting
funding arrangements for training providers.  The evidence, however, shows the contrary;
they exhibit a marked preference for ORF-style contracts - tying part, or in some cases all,
of their funding to the achievement of outputs.  At the end of the nine-month launch period
for JTPA (October 1983 to June 1984), 46% of all provider contracts were based on ORF
principles, by the first full year of operation the proportion had risen to two-thirds, and by
the end of the 1980s, 80% were using ORF-style contracts (Donahue, 1989; Hoachlander,
1989).
Three reasons can be identified for such a preference.  First, it is a means of ensuring
provider accountability.  Secondly, it ensures that training providers are working towards
the same goals against which SDAs are themselves judged.  Thirdly, it allows SDAs to
disguise some of the administrative costs of running the programmes.  JTPA legislation
puts a limit on the proportion spent on administration (originally this was set at 15%,
although since 1992 this has been raised to 20%).  However, if an SDA concludes an ORF
contract with training providers, all payments made under this arrangement count as
training costs and none are counted as administration.  This heightens the incentive to
offer training providers ORF contracts, since many SDAs find it difficult to meet the
administrative cost constraint.  In addition, it encourages SDAs to transfer administrative
functions - including important ones such as trainee recruitment and placement - on
training providers.
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There is, however, little information on the specifics of the ORF contracts used by SDAs -
indeed it is difficult to determine which types are the most common.  Nevertheless, it has
been suggested that a typical ORF contract is one in which some 10-20% of funding is
contingent on certain outputs being achieved.  Other, more stringent ORF contracts have
been identified.  For example, in Baltimore some of the early contracts paid 20% on
enrolment, 40% on mid-point proficiency tests, 20% on end-of-programme tests and 20%
on job placement at or above the minimum wage.  More recently, the focus has shifted (in
line with the changes in the DoL’s standards) towards end of programme and post-
programme triggers.  It now pays nothing on enrolment, 40% at the mid-point, 30% on
completion and 30% on placement achieved within 30 days of completion (Green et al.,
1993: 21).  Despite these examples, the evidence suggests that the US system of linking
provider funds to performance is less extensive than currently practised in Britain.  Indeed,
at all levels in the US system the emphasis on ORF appears weaker.  Nevertheless,
evaluations of JTPA have paid particular attention to the practical consequences ORF has
for training delivery in the US.
1.10.2 Evaluation
The eligibility criteria for participation in JTPA programmes have a major bearing on
how ORF works in practice.  Title II-A programmes are restricted to those with family
income below a level denoting ‘relative poverty’ or those who receive some form of
public assistance (Devine and Heckman, 1996).  Hence, there is no requirement that
participants need be unemployed and there is no restriction on the degree or duration
of economic disadvantage.  According to some estimates (e.g. US General Accounting
Office, 1989) there are between 10 and 39 million Americans eligible for JTPA, yet only
about one million of these participate each year.  How, then, are these people selected
from the many who are eligible?
In principle, procedural penalties for falling short of performance standards and
financial incentives for exceeding them (as discussed above) discourage SDAs from
serving the more difficult-to-train social groups, since a focus on them raises costs and
makes it more difficult to meet performance standards.  Awarding training providers
with ORF contracts further encourages ‘creaming’ - that is, the non-random selection of
participants.  Both suggest that creaming is likely under JTPA and that ‘service
providers choose program participants very carefully’ with job-readiness a key
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consideration (Walker, et al., 1986: 24). However, the form creaming takes and its
significance is an empirical question which many JTPA evaluations seek to address.
At a crude level, patterns of JTPA participation show that some groups are over-
represented in the programme compared to their share among those eligible, while
others are under-represented.  For example, Donahue (1989: 15) found that women
were under-represented by 7%, Hispanics by 9%, welfare recipients by 5% and high
school dropouts by 35%.  The over-represented groups included men (9%), whites
(7%), blacks (30%) and high school graduates (16%).  The evidence also suggests that
the shift from a process-based system of funding under CETA to a performance-based
system under JTPA has tilted the balance against the disadvantaged in favour of the
more employable fraction of those eligible for JTPA entry.  The groups under-
represented in JTPA are the same groups which suffered a drop in representation
following the switch from CETA to JTPA.  The unemployed, women, minorities and
high school dropouts all fell as a proportion of enrolled trainees; whites, the employed
or recently employed, men and high school graduates saw their share rise (US General
Accounting Office, 1985).  Furthermore, screening may also take place within these
groups.  Training providers will often be able to observe - via interviews, application
forms and references - characteristics which government training programmes may
have difficulty altering, but which are likely to affect labour market success.  These
include age, intelligence, family attitudes towards work and so on.
These findings raise a major policy issue: is the pool of eligible participants so large
that it allows providers to systematically identify the most promising candidates for
training while weeding out those least likely to get jobs and/or stay the course (i.e. to
make it look as though they are adding more value than they really are)?  To make this
particular point Donahue uses an analogy worth quoting at length:
‘Harvard Business School graduates tend to earn more, over the
course of their careers, than the average for the population as a whole.
If the Harvard Business School selected its students randomly, this
would be clear evidence that sitting through two years of  case studies
increased business acumen and earning power.  But students are not
selected randomly.  The screening process is sufficiently rigorous that
the people selected for admission would still tend to earn somewhat
more than the population average if they spent two years in the Peace
Corps, or learning to play the harp, instead of studying cases.  It is
impossible to distinguish conclusively between the value added by the
professors and the value identified by the admissions office.  A similar
uncertainly complicates JTPA’s contractual system of accountability’
(1989: 17; his emphasis).
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This view also indicates the interconnected issues of screening (or creaming), value
added and accountability.
More sophisticated analyses of the extent of creaming have also been carried out.  Like
the studies reviewed above, these start out by comparing the social characteristics of
JTPA participants with those eligible for, but not included in, the programme; their
findings are similar.  Anderson et al.’s (1993) examination of the Title II-A programme
in the State of Tennessee, for example, found that women, the less educated (high
school dropouts in particular), benefit recipients and older workers are significantly
under-represented in JTPA programmes.  However, bivariate comparisons may
capture other confounding factors: for instance, dropouts are almost five times more
likely to be benefit recipients with a physical or mental disability as well as being
educationally disadvantaged.  This shows the importance of undertaking multivariate
analyses of the chances of being selected for inclusion in the JTPA programme.  Using
this approach, the better educated are significantly more likely to be selected to
participate, but there is no additional dropout effect on the chances of selection.
Similarly, gender and ethnicity have no significant effect on the probability of selection,
despite bivariate suggestions to the contrary.  In other words, Anderson et al.’s (1993)
analysis suggests that the only real selection criteria is better education; women, ethnic
minorities and dropouts tend to be less educated rather than being directly
discriminated against.
For creaming to take place, one also needs to show that a biased selection of
participants leads to higher placement rates than would occur had the trainee
population exactly mirrored those eligible to take part.  Adopting such an approach,
Anderson et al. (1993) show that creaming does take place.  Simulations suggest that
placement rates in Tennessee would fall from 71% to 62% under these counterfactual
circumstances.  Although modest, placement rates would fall by nearly one-quarter if
JTPA were focused exclusively on high school dropouts - a group which faces high and
multiple barriers to employment.  However, the multiplicity of barriers they face would -
unless factored into the evaluation system - prompt creaming within the dropout
population.
Other studies have sought to examine the effect  that different performance regimes
have on the nature of the training delivered under JTPA and the extent of creaming.
Most notably, Cragg (1997) assesses inter alia whether states which offer SDAs with
- 50 -
relatively high rewards for exceeding performance targets and harsh sanctions for
falling short have a greater tendency to cream off the more able individuals.  The
analysis is based on a nationally representative survey which allows one to pick out a
sample of individuals eligible for JTPA (and its predecessor, CETA) as well as a
sample of individuals enrolled on the programme.
Using this approach Cragg examines the consequences of inter-state variations in
performance regimes.  These variations are captured in four ways: first, up to 6% (now
5%) of a State’s JTPA budget may be used for incentive payments to SDAs - the
higher the percentage set aside for this purpose, the greater the financial incentives for
meeting performance standards set.  Second, states may choose to pass on to SDAs
all or some of the performance standards they are themselves set by the DoL - as
more standards are required, higher incentives are generated.  Third, the likelihood that
SDAs will be punished for poor performance can be proxied by the number of
standards which need to be met in order to avoid punishment.  Fourth, states may be
lenient towards SDAs in implementing the rewards and sanctions regime; this can be
detected by whether or not states permit SDAs to make special appeals for unexpected
difficulties encountered - 29% of States allow special appeals of this type.
Multivariate analysis can then be used to compare the enrolment probabilities of
individuals.  In addition to variations in performance regimes, other variables - such as
gender, age, education, ethnicity, labour market experience and local unemployment -
are also entered.  The results of these analyses indicate that high incentive regimes
encourage enrolment of the more able individuals from the eligible pool.  They also
show that creaming has become more prevalent after the switch to JTPA with its
emphasis on performance incentives.
The types of training offered under JTPA reflect the emphasis placed on job placement
rates.  Four types of training are offered: classroom instruction; on-the-job training; help
with job search; and work experience.5  In general, the lengthier the training the lower
the job placement rate.  So, for example, work experience and classroom-based
training take, on average, longer to complete, yet they have the poorest placement
records.  On the other hand, the least intensive JTPA type of training - job search -
                                               
5  SDAs have considerable latitude in the kind of training provided in their areas.  For example,
Tennessee has 14 SDAs with a wide range of training approaches.  In Nashville, on-the-job training is
rarely offered to participants, but classroom training, work experience and job search assistance are quite
common.  In contrast, in the Memphis area, which has traditionally had a much higher unemployment
rate, on-the-job training is the more common type of JTPA training offered (Anderson et al., 1993).
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posts almost the highest placement rate.  The emphasis JTPA places on getting
trainees into jobs and the use of ORF provider contracts has seen a pronounced shift
towards types of training best placed to boost placement rates.  As a result, the
change-over from CETA to JTPA saw job search enrolments rise by 535% and on-the-
job training grow by 80%, while work experience fell by 84% and classroom instruction
declined by 19% (Donahue, 1989).  The implication is clear: the quicker and more
reliably a type of training leads to placement, the greater the emphasis on that type of
training.  Such a shift in training provision may indicate that the system of performance
management is creating more efficient types of training.  However, what may be
efficient in the short-term may be detrimental in the long-run.  Furthermore, groups with
the greatest chance of re-employment (e.g. whites, high school graduates) have seen
their representation rise among the more successful types of JTPA delivery such as
on-the-job training, while those with the poorest chances have seen their share fall.
Some researchers have cast doubt on the relevance of the performance standards
themselves, especially in the light of JTPA’s specified aim of delivering a measurable
return on investment in terms of ‘the increased employment and earnings of
participants and the reduction in welfare dependency’ (JTPA, section 106(a), quoted in
Orr et al., 1995: 5).  Subsequent evaluations of the JTPA programme have suggested
that the short-term performance measures used to reward or penalise SDAs and
training providers have little association with participants’ longer-term employment,
earnings and benefit dependency prospects.  For example, Doolittle et al. (1993)
calibrate these short-term performance measures against a longer-term evaluation of
the performance of JTPA participants.  The evidence for this study comes from the
National JTPA Study which tracked the labour market performance of Title II-A
applicants in 16 SDAs. Applicants were randomly assigned to two groups: two-thirds
were allowed to enrol, while the remaining third were prevented from enrolling for 18
months (for a summary, see Bloom et al., 1997; for overview of evaluation techniques,
see Fay, 1996).  Doolittle et al. (1993) found that SDAs with strong performance
according to the DoL’s short-term measures - such as the percentage entering
employment on exit and average wage rates on placement -  appeared to add little
value to a participant’s prospects over a 30 month post-training period.  This has led
some to argue that:
‘performance measures are virtually useless in making rational
decisions about effectiveness, even though they provide political
protection because they make JTPA seem like a performance-driven
program’ (Grubb, 1996: 26).
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However, it must be borne in mind that the US performance management system relies
more on procedural ‘sticks’ than ORF ‘carrots’.
1.10.3 Recent and Future Developments
In recognition of some of these problems, the JTPA has been modified on several
occasions.  The 1988-1990 reforms, for example, were designed to shift the
programme’s emphasis towards the provision of skills for sustained employment as
opposed to job search activities whose effect might be more short-term.  These reforms
involved a staged transition from end-of-programme to post-programme performance
measures.  The new measures were devised to evaluate JTPA participant performance
13 weeks after programme completion.  These measures included employment rates,
average weekly earnings, proportion of welfare recipients in work and average number
of weeks worked.
However, the most extensive changes to JTPA were the 1992 amendments to the
legislation.  The amendments had two aims.  First, additional eligibility criteria were
introduced in order to target the programme more directly towards those most in need.
In addition to being economically disadvantaged, at least 65% of participants must
have at least one ‘barrier to employment’, such as having a disability, being a school
dropout, lacking basic skills or having childcare responsibilities.  In order to target
youth, and especially those at greatest risk of economic exclusion, a separate Title (II-
C) was created for youth programmes under JTPA.  The 1992 amendments specified
that a minimum of half of those recruited to this part of JTPA must be high school
dropouts.  In this way the legislators have attempted to counter the effects of creaming
by imposing a ceiling beyond which participation would not be permitted.  In other
words, this is an example of ‘dredging’ on the basis of targeting policy to those most in
need.  Secondly, the 1992 amendments were a further attempt to shift the emphasis
away from job search and short-term placement towards training and long-term
employment.  In order to encourage intensive training programmes, ‘stand alone’ job
search activities were outlawed and instead greater emphasis was placed on skill
acquisition, training and qualification attainment (Green et al., 1993).
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1.11 ORF in the European Union
Beyond the UK, it is difficult to find other EU examples of the use of ORF in the delivery
of government-funded VET.  However, experiments with ORF in higher education can
be found in several Member States of the EU.  In Sweden, for example, resources in
higher education have since 1993 been allocated, in part, according to the outputs
individual institutions generate; 60% of Swedish university funding is dependent on
student grades, while the remaining 40% is allocated according to the number of full-
time equivalent students taught at each institution.  In other Member States the
principle of ORF is also used to allocate higher education funds.  In Finland, 5% of
university funding is tied to results, while in Denmark a proportion of funds is allocated
according to the number of students who successfully complete their course.  In
Germany, some Länder have begun to experiment with the allocation of funds
according to performance criteria.  For example, in 1993 North-Rhine Westphalia
decided to allocate 10% of institutions’ budgets according to the number of graduates
over the previous three years, thereby giving institutions economic incentives to ensure
that students do not drop out and that they graduate within the appropriate timescale.
This represents a significant move away from the traditional German approach of
funding entirely according to inputs (European Commission, 1996: 41-45).
However, cases of ORF being used in VET delivery are rare.  For some Member
States, shifting the emphasis away from allocating block grants to institutions towards
capitation funding represents a major move; yet this falls well short of ORF - although
perhaps this represents an intermediate step towards considering the relationship
between inputs and outputs.  Since 1990, for example, vocational education in
Denmark has been funded according to the so-called ‘taximeter’ system.  The main
principle here is that programmes are placed in certain price categories, and
institutions delivering these programmes receive funding directly related to the number
of full-time equivalent students enrolled at four points in the year (Hansen and
Rasmussen, 1996).  Funds to cover administration and other operating costs are also
related to the number of students enrolled.  In addition, institutions receive a basic
grant dependent on the nature of the institution, its size and the number of courses
offered (Gasskov, 1997).  This still leaves a large part of funding linked to the numbers
enrolled, albeit counted four times rather than once a year.
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At least one EU country - the Netherlands - is contemplating introducing an ORF
formula for its adult and vocational training centres.  The new funding formula is
expected to take effect from the year 2000.6  The policy debate this has prompted
revolves mainly around the mechanisms needed to ensure that institutional funding
rewards value added.  The method proposed differs significantly from the US tactic of
tightening up on eligibility rules to minimise creaming and the British approach of the
same outputs triggering differential returns in certain circumstances.
The Dutch proposals attempt to tie institutional funding more directly to the difference
between students’ educational level on entry and their level on exit.  Ideally, this
requires that all students be subject to a detailed test of their knowledge and skills upon
entry and then again on exit.  However, this would be cumbersome and costly to carry
out.  Instead, the proposals suggest that previous education at the time of entry be
taken as the initial benchmark from which students start.  This would, then, be used to
determine an institution’s input-funding; that is, students starting from a low base would
be funded for longer periods to follow courses of a prescribed length, while those with
higher-level entry qualifications would be funded for shorter periods.  Years which are
repeated, or spent on a course which is later abandoned in favour of something else,
add little to the student’s knowledge, and hence no additional funding would be allowed
under these circumstances.
The proposals also suggest an element of ORF, although the balance between this and
input-funding is yet to be fully spelt out.  What is clear, however, is that the award of an
educational qualification is the output measure since:
‘A diploma is the only type of educational qualification which is formally
acknowledged by society at large, and people with diplomas have
better employment prospects.  It is therefore intended that output
should in the future account for a greater proportion of total funding
than it does at present’ (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science,
1997: 13).
The question of whether qualification outputs should be conceived more broadly to
include modular certificates as well as completed diplomas has also been debated in
Dutch policy circles.  The proposals recommend a narrow focus on the latter since a
broader focus - including modular certification - would bring many disadvantages.
These include: an administrative burden as hundreds of thousands of modules are
completed each year; the heightened risk of fraud; the cost of monitoring and
                                               
6  Much of the subsequent discussion is taken from a document kindly provided by Peter Vrancken
(Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 1997).
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maintaining effective supervision of the system; and increased likelihood that
institutions would respond by awarding large numbers of low-level modular certificates
rather than full diplomas in order to trigger ORF payments.
Recently, agreement on these proposals has been reached.  The proportion of funding
comprising ORF has been set at 20% with 80% dependent on the number of students
enrolled; bonus payments will be given for students with low entry levels; and courses
will carry one of a small number of different prices.  Interestingly, two elements of the
proposed value-added arrangement will be excluded when the new funding regime is
due to become operational in the year 2000.  Students who enrol more than once for a
course will still be counted for enrolment-based funding and the period of their
enrolment will not be dependent on their entry level.  These elements have been
temporarily excluded from the system of value-added since the necessary data for their
inclusion are not yet available.  However, it has been agreed that these data will be
collected and that these two elements will be subsequently included in the funding
formula in (probably) 2004.
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1.12 Summary
From this review of case studies, several general points readily emerge:
· First, beyond the UK it is difficult to find other EU examples of ORF in the delivery of
government-funded VET.  However, experiments with ORF in the educational
system can be detected - in Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Germany.
Nevertheless, some Member States - such as the Netherlands - are planning to
introduce ORF into parts of their VET system in the near future.  The longest
standing use of ORF in the delivery of government-funded VET is to be found in the
US.
· Second, despite appearances to the contrary, the use of ORF in the UK and the US
differs markedly.  These differences include the emphasis it is given, its use along
the contracting chain and the nature of the institutional environment in which it is
embedded.
· Third, ORF is not a simple and straightforward mechanism, easily understood in
practice.  On the contrary, it is often complex and varied.
· Fourth, even within the UK and the US systems there are large gaps in our
knowledge.  For example, for neither country do we have sufficient information
about the nature of training provider contracts and their consequences.
 
 However, the literature reviewed in the course of this section does provide us with
concrete examples, evidence and well-grounded research material from which to
reflect on the policy questions posed earlier.  This opportunity is taken up in the
concluding section which follows.
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 SECTION FOUR:  CONCLUSIONS
 
 The principle of providing a financial incentive to reward a predetermined level of
performance in VET delivery coupled with a financial penalty for those failing to achieve
this level is deceptively straightforward.  However, the use of ORF in VET delivery
raises many policy issues worthy of note.  Section Two has highlighted several of the
more important to bear in mind when evaluating and assessing ORF regimes, while
Section Three has provided us with the details necessary to answer these questions
from a real-world perspective.  In this concluding section of the Report we bring both of
these sections together - reflecting on the policy questions posed by summarising
some of the case study evidence presented.
 
· What level of ORF is required to reap the optimum benefits of tying funding to
output?
 The case studies indicate the range of emphasis that can be given to ORF - from 75%
in the case of TfW in the UK to around 5% in the case of JTPA in the US.  Both
claim to be set at the optimum level.
 
· Is ORF passed on to all those in the contracting chain?
 This need not be the case.  Indeed, while we know much about the contractual
relationship between central government and its first-tier suppliers (TECs in the
case of the UK and states in the case of the US), less is known about the
contractual relationships further down the chain - especially those which govern the
operations of training providers.
 
· How is output defined?
 Typically, definitions include qualifications, jobs subsequently obtained, earning levels,
enrolment on other programmes and reduction in welfare dependency.
 
· How is output measured?
 On the whole, absolute measures of output are used more often.  In other words,
outputs are measured with little reference to the individual’s/institution’s starting
position.  Experiments with value-added measures are more exceptional.
 
· How are funding uncertainties minimised?
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 In the US, the Federal government is insulated from funding uncertainty by basing state
JTPA budgets on the basis of need - only 5% of their budget can be used for ORF.
In the UK, TECs budgets are subject to a funding ceiling, with ORF operable only
up to that point.
 
· Do the measures of performance used to financially reward and penalise training
providers act as good proxies for the long-term labour market prospects of
trainees?
 Research evidence suggests that the proxies are not that good.  However, it is not
obvious what other proxies could be used, without putting training providers’ cash
flow under even more pressure.
 
· Are only the best candidates ‘creamed off’ onto output-related funded
programmes?
 ‘Creaming’ is an inherent problem to ORF.  While its extent remains an empirical
research question, its minimisation is a key policy challenge faced by all ORF
systems.
 
· To what extent are eligibility criteria used to counter the danger of ‘creaming’ by
requiring training providers to ‘dredge’?
 Eligibility criteria have been used as a means to target programmes towards those
most in need.  This provides an important means of minimising ‘creaming’.
 
· How is participation of disadvantaged members of the labour market protected?
 In some cases, a certain proportion of those enrolled must be from certain groups such
as high school dropouts in the US.  However, not all disadvantaged groups are
protected in this way, and they may therefore lose out.
 
· What consequences does ORF have for the content and occupational spread of
training provision?
 In the absence of corrective measures, there tends to be a shift away from ‘high cost’
and/or long duration courses towards ‘low cost’ and/or short courses when
increased emphasis is given to ORF.  Particular types of training delivery also
suffer - such as classroom-based training - and training times are reduced.
 
· Does ORF lead to cash flow problems for training providers?
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 Reliance on funding triggered by outputs inevitably adds to training providers’ cash flow
difficulties.  As above, this may affect some training providers more than others.
 
· Are particular types of training provider more at risk than others from the operation
of ORF?
 UK evidence suggests that some training providers may have difficulty in remaining
economically viable.  While employers and industry associations may continue to
provide ‘high cost’ training via cross-subsidisation from other areas, specialist
stand-alone providers may suffer greater financial pressure and exit the market
altogether.
 
· Does ORF raise barriers to entry for new training providers?
 There is evidence that ORF has raised entry barriers to new training providers,
especially those in ‘high cost’ training areas.  This reduces the range and choice of
provision as well as the intensity of competition between providers.
 
· Are the administrative rules and regulations that accompany ORF simpler or more
complicated than other systems?
 There is a policy dilemma between a complex measure of output which is equitable,
and one which is simple and less equitable, but easier to administer.  The ORF
mechanism in the UK is complicated and fairly sophisticated, while both the US
approach and the Dutch proposals are simpler and easier to administer.
 
· Does ORF reward the value added by training intervention?
 In the UK, the same output carries a different level of reward depending on the type of
trainee.  However, differentiated payment regimes are complex and cumbersome,
and they are not always passed on to all those in the contracting chain.
 
· Does ORF reward all or only some of the value added by training providers?
 Most ORF systems recognise only a handful of outputs.  As a result, training providers
are not always rewarded for the value they add to the stock of human capital.
Recognition of part-outputs, however, makes the system more bureaucratic, as
recently acknowledged by the Dutch proposals for ORF.
 
· What checks and balances are in place to ensure probity and reliability?
 An effective ORF system requires that the output indicators not be fraudulently
achieved by placing trainees with ‘friendly’ employers or by bending the rules in
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other ways.  Systems which define output in terms of qualifications and rely on
provider involvement in the certification process (such as those in the UK) are most
at risk.
 
· What mechanisms are used to counter these problems?
 US policy-makers have tended to counter many of these problems by revising
primary legislation which governs the JTPA and, in particular, the eligibility criteria.
UK policy-makers, on the other hand, have relied more on variations in the contract
which governs its relationship with the TECs.
 
· How successful is ORF in achieving its aims?
Despite the evidence reviewed in this Report, it is difficult to be unequivocal on how
successful ORF has been in achieving efficiency, reducing administrative costs,
increasing flexibility, and enhancing transparency and accountability.  Often ORF is
but one element, albeit a significant one, in a host of institutional and funding
reforms.  In addition, ORF is rarely used as the sole instrument of performance
management, rather it is one element within a package of measures.  It is,
therefore, difficult to isolate with certainty its effects.  For example, both the UK and
US case studies indicate that a number of reforms have been made partly as a
result of introducing an ORF mechanism, e.g. narrowing the eligibility criteria for
JTPA in the US.  Whether these reforms were necessitated by the introduction of
ORF and its associated imperfections or whether ORF has made the funding and
training system more transparent (and therefore made existing problems more
visible) is just one issue which is difficult to assess.
Introducing an element of ORF within the public sector funding of training requires
careful thought in terms of both principle and practice.  In principle, ORF may present
many benefits to existing funding and training regimes.  In practice, however, it does
not operate in a vacuum.  Hence, it may distort or enhance a number of other aims and
policies.  This Report has presented many of these abstract principles.  It has then
used the British system of funding government training schemes through TECs, the US
system of JTPA delivery via the states and SDAs, and Dutch proposals to use some
form of ORF to finance adult and vocational training to show how these principles
relate to practical implementation and policy development.  Many of these issues have
wide applicability.  Therefore, the discussion and cases presented provide material
from which policy-makers and other interested parties may wish to borrow or learn.
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